

**Cybercrime,
Mobile Banking Fraud,
Check Fraud,
Embezzlement**

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Smartphones and Tablets

Criminals are targeting smartphones and tablets



Mobile malware grew 155% in 2011

and

614% from March 2012 to March 2013

Juniper Networks, 2013 Mobile Threat Report

“There are several indicators of a shift in mobile malware, from being a cottage industry to a more developed market...”

Juniper Networks, 2013 Mobile Threat Report

Targeting Markets with Greatest ROI

Shortened Supply Chains and Distribution

Multiple Paths to Market

Juniper Networks, 2013 Mobile Threat Report

Industry experts expect mobile threats to surpass PC threats.

- 10% of mobile apps leak logins or passwords
- 25% expose personally identifiable info (PII)
- 40% communicate with third parties.

“Cybercrime: This Is War” Report by JPMorganChase 2013

An emerging trend:

“Spear Phishing” attacks (Trojans) on Android device apps that allow users to download Gmail attachments.

It can compromise the mobile devices and the PCs or Macs to which these devices connect....

Spear Phishing is based on social engineering.... Fraudsters gather information about mobile users through groups with which they are affiliated, as well as social media channels.

Kaspersky Lab - research April 2013

App Security

Product Reviews: CNET.com, PCmag.com

MyLookOut, Bullguard, etc.)



Mobile Banking and Deposit Fraud:

Double Debits



Mobile Banking Deposit Fraud

Scenario: A check is mailed to Dishonest Dan

- Dan deposits the check using smart phone app
 - Digitized check is paid at drawer's bank
- 10 days later, Dan cashes the same check at a check cashing store
 - 2nd check hits the drawer's bank account (check is presented for payment twice)
- **WHO TAKES THE LOSS??**

The answer is found in the Rules
governing Check 21

Mobile Banking & Check 21

1. “Mobile Banking” is another form of Remote Deposit Capture
2. Remote Deposit Capture is part of Check 21
3. Check 21 has specific rules that govern Remote Deposit Capture, which includes Mobile Banking
4. Rules determine who takes the loss, and why

Check Clearing for the 21st Century Act

- Check 21 law enacted on October 28, 2003; became effective on October 28, 2004
- Allows the recipient of an original paper to create a digital version of the original check, and deposit the digital image electronically.
- Under Check 21's "warranty" provision, the converting party warrants that it will not present the check for payment twice.

Check 21 Rules

§ 229.52 Substitute check warranties

- A bank that transfers, presents, or returns a substitute check (or a paper or electronic representation of a substitute check)... warrants... that—

§ 229.52 Substitute check warranties

- (2) No depository bank, drawee, drawer, or indorser will receive presentment or return of, or otherwise be charged for, the **substitute check, the original check, or a paper or electronic representation** of the substitute check or original check such that that person will be asked to make a payment based on a check that it already has paid.

§ 229.52 Substitute check warranties

(b) Warranty recipients. A bank makes the warranties... to the person to which the bank transfers, presents, or returns the substitute check or a paper or electronic representation of such substitute check and to any subsequent recipient, which could include a **collecting or returning bank**, the **depository bank**, the **drawer**, the **drawee**, the **payee**, the **depositor**, and **any indorser**. These parties receive the warranties regardless of whether they received the substitute check or a paper or electronic representation of a substitute check.

§ 229.56 Liability

(c) Jurisdiction. A person may bring an action to enforce a claim... in any United States district court or in any other court of competent jurisdiction. Such claim shall be brought within one year of the date on which the person's cause of action accrues... a cause of action accrues as of the date on which the injured person first learns...of the facts and circumstances giving rise to the cause of action, including the identity of the warranting or indemnifying bank against which the action is brought.

Under the § 229.56 Warranty...

Liability for the loss falls to the bank that allowed its customer to use its smart phone app.

Bank can charge the loss against its customer
(assuming \$\$ is still there)

Mobile Banking and Deposit Fraud:

Holder in Due Course



Scenario: A title insurance company gives John Doe a check at closing. John Doe deposits the check via a mobile app, then comes back to office and returns the check, asking that it be made payable to John Doe or Jane Doe.

The company doesn't think to place a
Stop Payment on the first check
because they have the check in hand.

1. If a physical check is returned for a replacement, place a stop payment on the returned check. It may have been deposited remotely.

2. Recipient **MUST** sign an affidavit stating the check was not "deposited."

3. An Affidavit does not provide protection, only a right to sue and collect legal fees.



Cyber Crime

How a Remote Town in Romania Has Become Cybercrime Central

By Yudhijit Bhattacharjee

January 31, 2011



How a Remote Town in Romania Has Become Cybercrime Central

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January 31, 2011



Expensive cars choke the streets of Râmnicu Vâlcea's bustling city center—top-of-the-line BMWs, Audis, and Mercedes driven by twenty- and thirty-something men sporting gold chains. I ask my cab driver if all these men have high-paying jobs, and he laughs. Then he holds up his hands, palms down, and wiggles his fingers as if typing on a keyboard. "They steal money on the Internet," he says.

The city of 120,000 has a nickname: Hackerville. It's something of a misnomer; the town is indeed full of online crooks, but only a small percentage of them are actual hackers. Most specialize in e-commerce scams and malware attacks on businesses.

Cyber crime is a mature,
underground international business
with well-organized syndicates
attacking companies, municipalities,
non-profits, and even power grids.

These syndicates also sell customized malware and instant hacking tools to novice cyber criminals, allowing them to quickly join the criminal community.

Malware and Hacking are the primary methods used to get inside an organization's computer system.

There are two primary types of malware:

auto-executable code

(a “drive-by” download)

that can happen merely by visiting an
infected website....

...and code that requires
interaction by users:

opening an email attachment or
clicking on an imbedded link

Keystroke Logger Viruses



Tracks every keystroke; sends hourly reports

Spreads by:

- Email, Web sites
- Infected files on network
- USB drive or CD

Trojan Horse



A malicious program concealed in something innocuous.

Contains keystroke logger virus

- Pictures, Video on Facebook and MySpace
- Free music downloads
- Email attachments

Corporate Identity Theft

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- ✓ Hackers target Accounts Receivable List

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- ✓ Hackers target Accounts Receivable List
- ✓ Send bogus change-of-bank notifications to customers

Corporate Identity Theft

- ✓ Hackers target Accounts Receivable List
- ✓ Send bogus change-of-bank notifications to customers
- ✓ New PO Box

Corporate Identity Theft

- ✓ Hackers target Accounts Receivable List
- ✓ Send bogus change-of-bank notifications to customers
- ✓ New PO Box
- ✓ New Bank R/T and account

Corporate Hacking

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- ✓ Banks: Monitor bank changes on outgoing repetitive wires

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- ✓ Banks: Monitor bank changes on outgoing repetitive wires
- ✓ Companies: Confirm ALL bank change notifications from vendors

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- ✓ Banks: Monitor bank changes on outgoing repetitive wires
- ✓ Companies: Confirm ALL bank change notifications from vendors
- ✓ Buy cyber crime and check fraud insurance

Corporate Hacking

- ✓ Banks: Monitor bank changes on outgoing repetitive wires
- ✓ Companies: Confirm ALL bank change notifications from vendors
- ✓ Buy cyber crime and check fraud insurance
- ✓ Use payee positive pay and high security checks

Phishing Emails

Can look legitimate

"Dear clients,

Your account **ACH and Wire transactions** have been **temporarily suspended** for your Security, due to the expiration of your security version. To download and install the **newest Updates**, follow this [link](#). As soon as it is set up, your transaction abilities will be fully restored. Best regards, Online security department, Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation."

Lead to account takeovers

Cyber Crime “Phishing” Attack:

eXperi-METAL INC.

v.

Comerica

\$560,000 Loss

CFO responded to phishing email with his bank login

Lawsuit



eXperi-METAL INC.

**Computer was taken over.
93 Wires, \$1,900,000 left the bank**

\$560,000 Unrecovered

Company sued the bank.

Who won the lawsuit?



<http://www.lerchearly.com/publications/499-commercial-lending-bulletin-september-october>

<http://www.alstonprivacy.com/blog.aspx?entry=4353>

WHY did the bank lose?

- 1. Programming error (immediately remedied) allowed funds exceeding Customer's actual account balance to be wired out of a ZBA acct, creating a \$2 million overdraft in the concentration acct.**
- 2. Five other companies were hit same day, same way**
- 3. Company was liable for CFO clicking on fake email**
- 4. Company "won" lawsuit against Comerica, but**
- 5. Company was not awarded attorney fees (> \$250K)**



Important Links

Summaries:

(This article is really good.)

<http://www.lercheary.com/publications/499-commercial-lending-bulletin-september-october>

<http://www.bankinfosecurity.com/court-favors-emi-in-fraud-suit-a-3750>

<http://www.pcworld.com/article/230392/article.html>

<http://www.alstonprivacy.com/blog.aspx?entry=4353>

Bench Opinion: <http://zra.com/attachments/article/43/ExperiMetal.pdf>

Choice Escrow and Land Title

vs.

BancorpSouth Bank

Important Link

<http://courtweb.pamd.uscourts.gov/courtwebsearch/mowd/qmC2dt555T.pdf>

Choice Escrow and Land Title vs. BancorpSouth Bank

- ✓ March 17, 2010: Bank received an internet-based request to wire **\$440,000** out of Choice Escrow's Trust Account
- ✓ Request not legitimate – Choice Escrow employee's computer was hacked, taken over by fraudsters
- ✓ **NO "Dual Authentication" in place at Company**
- ✓ Wire transfer request to send \$440K to **Republic of Cypress**

<http://courtweb.pamd.uscourts.gov/courtwebsearch/mowd/qmC2dt555T.pdf>

Computer Takeover: NO “Dual Control”

- ✓ Wire to Cypress was initiated using the User ID and password of a Choice Escrow employee
- ✓ Wire was initiated from IP address registered to Choice
- ✓ Bank authenticated employee's computer by detecting the secure device ID token that Bank previously installed
- ✓ Immediately after wiring funds, Bank auto-generated a Transaction Receipt that was faxed to and received by Choice Escrow. Fax placed on a desk, without review.

Bank: Customer Failed to Implement “Dual Control”

- ✓ Bank required online banking customers sending wires to utilize “Dual Control”
- ✓ **Dual Control = 2 computers, 2 logins, 2 passwords**
- ✓ Wire transfer could only be effectuated by two individuals using separate User IDs and passwords
- ✓ Choice declined in writing, **TWICE**, to use Dual Control

Feeble Argument about Dual Control

- ✓ Choice contended “Dual Control” was not “commercially reasonable” because...
- ✓ “...at times, one or both of the two individuals authorized to perform wire transfers through the [bank] system were out of the office due to various reasons.”
- ✓ Court disagreed.
- ✓ Choice Escrow held liable for loss.

Official Comments to the Funds Transfers provisions of the UCC:

The purpose of having a security procedure deemed to be commercially reasonable is to encourage banks to **institute reasonable safeguards against fraud but not to make them insurers against fraud.**

A security procedure is not commercially unreasonable simply because another procedure might have been better or because the judge deciding the question would have opted for a more stringent procedure. **The standard is not whether the security procedure is the best available.**

Official Comments to the Funds Transfers provisions of the UCC:

Sometimes an informed customer refuses a security procedure that is commercially reasonable and suitable for that customer and insists on using a higher-risk procedure because it is more convenient or cheaper. In that case, under the last sentence of subsection (c), the customer has voluntarily assumed the risk of failure of the procedure and cannot shift the loss to the bank.

Court Order, March 18, 2013

"For the foregoing reasons, the Court **GRANTS** the **MOTION OF DEFENDANT BANCORPSOUTH FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT**. All other pending motions, including all other motions for summary judgment (including motions for partial summary judgment), are **DENIED** as moot. Accordingly, it is **ORDERED** that summary judgment is entered in favor of defendant BancorpSouth Bank."

Prevent Online Banking Fraud

Require 2 different computers to move \$\$

1. Computers #1-99 can "originate" wires
2. Dedicated "banking-only" computer to "release" the wire / ACH

Use a Layered Approach for Wires & ACH

- **Dual Factor Authorization**
 - (“something you have (token), and something you know”)
- **“Out of Band” Authentication**
 - (text msg from bank with password for that specific wire)
- **Tokens**
- **Transactional Alerts via**
 - Text
 - E-mail
 - Voice call back (human confirmation)

“Physical” Attacks –

“Skimmers” in credit/debit card devices

Infected flash/thumb drives



Fraudsters Targeting Banks

Facebook

1 Billion Users

Hi Greg,

www.facebookk.com

facebook

Email

Password

Login

Keep me logged in

[Forgot your password?](#)

Facebook helps you connect and share with the people in your life.



FAKE URL

Sign Up

It's free and always will be.

First Name:

Last Name:

Your Email:

Re-enter Email:

New Password:

I am: Select Sex:

Birthday:

Month:

Day:

Year:

Why do I need to provide this?

Sign Up

Here

Privacy ▸ Profile

Basic **Contact Information**

Control who can see which sections of your profile. Visit the [Applications page](#) in order to change settings for applications. Visit the [Search Privacy page](#) to make changes to what people can see about you if they search for you.

See how a friend sees your profile:

Profile	 Only Friends 	[?]
Basic Info	 My Networks and Friends Friends of Friends Only Friends Customize...	[?]
Personal Info	 Customize...	[?]
Status and Links	 Only Friends 	[?]
Photos Tagged of You	 Only Friends 	[?]
Edit Photo Albums Privacy Settings		
Videos Tagged of You	 Only Friends 	[?]
Friends	 Only Friends 	[?]
Wall Posts	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/> Friends may post to my Wall	[?]
	 Only Friends 	
Education Info	 Only Friends 	[?]



Ramnit Worm Threatens Online Account

Facebook Targeted by Fraudsters Seeking Log-in Credentials

THE JOURNAL REPORT

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THE WALL STREET JOURNAL

Monday, September 26, 2011 82

What's a Company's Biggest Security Risk? **YOU.**

Opening an unexpected email attachment from a colleague

HOW YOU SEE IT

Being a good co-worker

HOW HACKERS SEE IT

An opportunity to inject a virus inside the corporate network, bypassing the firewall

Bringing a new personal gadget to the work network

HOW YOU SEE IT

An opportunity to keep up with the latest technology

HOW HACKERS SEE IT

A new route for viruses and malware to stake their way into corporate systems

Posting job details on LinkedIn

HOW YOU SEE IT

Creating a professional presence and finding another potential job

HOW HACKERS SEE IT

Reconnaissance data to map out company firewalls and target specific users with spear-phishing attacks

Using personal Web email for work

HOW YOU SEE IT

Making it easier to work from home or to move files between computers

HOW HACKERS SEE IT

A path to access critical data from relatively unprotected sources



SEPTEMBER 26, 2011

What's a Company's Biggest Security Risk? You.

Employees don't mean to be the primary entry point for hackers. But they are.

By GEOFFREY A. FOWLER

We are the weakest link.

Hacking attacks against companies are growing bigger and bolder—witness a string of high-profile breaches this year at Sony Corp., Citigroup Inc. and others. But gone are the days when hackers would simply find holes in corporate networks to steal valuable data. Large companies have grown wise to the threat of hacking, and have spent the past 30 years hardening the perimeters of their networks with upgraded technology.

These days, criminals aren't just hacking networks. They're hacking us, the employees.

"The security gap is end users," says Kevin Mandia, chief executive of security firm Mandiant Corp. The majority of corporate security breaches his firm is currently investigating involve hackers who gained access to company networks by exploiting well-intentioned employees.

Consider what happened in March at EMC Corp.'s RSA security unit, the maker of computer login devices used by thousands of other companies. A hacker sent emails to two small groups of employees that looked innocent enough, including a spreadsheet titled "2011 Recruitment plan." The message was so convincing that one employee retrieved it from the "junk mail" folder and then opened the attachment. Doing so introduced a virus inside RSA's network that eventually gave the hacker access to sensitive company data and enabled later attacks against RSA's customers.



Employees have more opportunities than ever to compromise company information. We not only screw up by clicking on emails from hackers that download viruses, letting them bypass corporate firewalls. We also open a Pandora's Box of security problems by circumventing company tech-support


What to Do if You've Been Hacked

Among the surprising advice: Don't shut down the computers

By BEN WORTHEN

It's a nightmare scenario every business fears.

Your tech department has spotted suspicious activity on the company network. Your customers and employees are getting hit with credit-card fraud and identity theft. MasterCard Inc. is on line 1.



The panic sets in: Your company has been hacked!

So, what do you do?

First, take a breath and remember that you're not alone. Last year, 662 organizations publicly disclosed data breaches, according to the nonprofit Identity Theft Resource Center, a figure that includes real-world theft and accidents as well as cyberintrusions. And the actual number is likely much higher than that, since not all hacking incidents get disclosed.

Next, remember that getting hacked doesn't have to be a business-crippling experience. While it will likely set a company back financially, if handled properly it won't have a long-lasting impact.

"The public is forgiving when it's apparent that the company is doing the right thing," says Lori Nugent, a lawyer at Wilson Elser Moskowitz Edelman & Dicker LLP who specializes in breach cases. In fact, if a company is on top of the technological problems and communicates well, it can build loyalty among its customers, she says.

There are a number of small but critical steps businesses need to take when they find out they've been

You May Be Fighting the Wrong Security Battles

How IT executives can determine the right amount to spend—and where to spend it

By LAWRENCE A. GORDON AND MARTIN P. LOEB

A recent wave of information-security breaches at high-profile companies has many executives on heightened alert. They're trying to figure out everything they can do to prevent breaches, limit the damage if one occurs, and be prepared to rebound quickly from whatever harm is done.

As they consider their options, two questions loom large: How much should they spend to protect their companies' information? And how can they get the most for their money?

Our research suggests they should spend substantially less than the expected loss from a breach, and perhaps spend it differently than many might think.



The One-Third Mark

We developed a model to help executives determine the optimal level of investment to protect a given set of information—whether it's customers' personal information, company financial data, strategic-planning documents or something else. The model weighs the potential loss from a security breach, the probability that a loss will occur, and the effectiveness of additional investments in security.

One key finding from the model: The amount a firm should spend to protect information is generally no more than one-third or so of the projected loss from a breach. Above that level, in most cases, each dollar spent will reduce the anticipated loss by less than a dollar.

A second key finding: It doesn't always pay to spend the biggest share of the security budget to protect the information that is most vulnerable to attack, as many companies do. For some highly vulnerable

10 Tips to Fight Insider Fraud



<http://www.bankinfosecurity.com/10-tips-to-fight-insider-fraud-a-4550>

10 Tips to Fight Insider Fraud

Organizations Often Fail to Fend Off the Obvious Risks

Tracy Kitten, March 2, 2012

Regardless of industry, insiders always pose the greatest threat to an organization's security. Insiders are risky, especially ones with axes to grind.

Researchers within CERT's Software Engineering Institute at Carnegie Mellon have reviewed internal threats for the last decade, examining the threats posed by so-called malicious insiders. Now CERT offers some new insights, about the threats posed by unintentional breaches - those that happen by accident.

This week, during RSA Conference 2012 in San Francisco, Dawn Capelli of the Software Engineering Institute at CERT, said most organizations continually fail to adequately address internal threats, though most agree insider fraud is a growing area of concern. from RSA.]



Dawn Capelli

"About 50 percent of all companies experience at least one malicious insider attack," said Capelli, who co-authored *The Search Guide to Insider Threats* with two other CERT researchers. "And an internal attack has more of an impact than an external attack."

When companies break down breaches, about one-third are directly linked to insiders, and more probably have some link to an insider that the organization simply has not identified. "A lot of the attacks we've seen this year, with cyber attacks, were unintentional," Capelli says.

<http://www.bankinfosecurity.com/10-tips-to-fight-insider-fraud-a-4550>

Top 10 Tips

Here are Capelli's top 10 tips for fighting the insider threat:

1. Repeat Offenders and Offenses. Learn from past incidents. Most organizations get hit

Protect Passwords

1

123456

2

12345

3

123456789

4

Password

5

qwerty

**FBI:
10 Most
Popular
Passwords**

6

trustno1

7

abc123

8

monkey

9

letmein

10

dragon

**FBI:
10 Most
Popular
Passwords**

Cracking Passwords

2009

- Online games service RockYou.com hacked
- 32 Million plain-text passwords stolen
- 14 Million unique passcodes were posted
- ✓ **Overnight, the way hackers cracked passwords changed!**

RockYou.com list confirmed nearly all **CAPITAL LETTERS** come at the beginning of a password. Nearly all **PUNCTUATION** and **NUMBERS** are at the end.

RockYou list revealed a strong tendency to use first names followed by years:

Christopher1965 or **Julia1984**

Passwords Posted on the Web Last Year

100,000,000+

5 Years Ago

The Time it Took a Hacker to Randomly Guess Your Password

Length	lowercase	+ Uppercase	+ numbers and symbols
6 Characters	10 Minutes	10 Hours	18 Days
7 Characters	4 Hours	23 Days	4 Years
8 Characters	4 Days	3 Years	463 Years
9 Characters	4 Months	178 Years	44,530 Years

Five years ago: 8 Characters, all lower case = 4 days

Today: 8 Characters, all lower case = 12 hours

Today

It Takes a Hacker 12 Hours to Randomly
Guess Your 8-Character Password

This \$12,000 computer
containing 8 AMD Radeon
GPU cards can brute force
the entire keyspace for any
eight-character password
in 12 hours.



Asd09871234zxcvvconradfcvg crp3adm3
xzlkjhyuiogrds waglitsxcvfdtermnbvFESS
Muniondesxcbswanhkmnb.com

Asd2071300042 zxcv0713vcxz lkKatieJean jhyuiogreglitster
Mnbv greg@safechecks.com
unionbank.com

zxcvbnmjklacapulco

www.logmein.com

qaswdc096524rfvfraves ginaRobinJohnson

fultonhjl8934etonavecanogaparkca91304xcvcb
info_SSAFEVVFGSsjkrobinzxcvbnmalisaelainesjklrobin_sklejk

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xzlkjhyuiogrds waglitsxcvfdtermnbvFESS
Muniondesxcbswanhkmnb.com

Asd2071300042 zxcv0713vcxz lkKatieJean jhyuiogreglitster
Mnbv **greg@safechecks.com**
unionbank.com

zxcvbnmjklacapulco

www.logmein.com

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214598fdseaced02_101285xcvnm,4037nm,.8400uipohkl185
hijklj5449jkl;0114bnm,779 zxcvcrp3adm3usbank

Track Your Kids

Track Your Kids Keystrokes

(without them knowing, ever.)

Kids keep 2 Facebook Accounts (Mom only sees one)

← → ↻ 🏠 🌐 www.facebookk.com

facebook

Email Password

Keep me logged in [Forgot your password?](#)

Facebook helps you connect and share with the people in your life.



Sign Up
It's free and always will be.

First Name:

Last Name:

Your Email:

Re-enter Email:


New Password:

I am: Select Sex:

Birthday: Month: Day: Year:

Why do I need to provide this?

Track Your Kids' Keystrokes



For Windows  For Mac OS 

eBLASTER 2010

Remote Monitoring Software

Knowing **EVERYTHING** They Do Online
is as Easy as Checking Your Email.

A 3D rendering of the eBLASTER software box. The box is white with a green horizontal band across the middle. Above the band, the text "eBLASTER" is visible. The band itself contains a photograph of a family (a man, a woman, and a child) looking at a laptop. Below the band, the SpectorSoft logo is visible in the bottom right corner.

Track Your Kids' Keystrokes

Spector Pro: Track your child's keystrokes, emails, MySpace, Facebook, IM, websites visited with Spector Pro (spectorssoft.com).

eBlaster forwards incoming and outgoing emails to your email address.

Spectorsoft.com/mobile

SpectorSoft - eBLASTER | mobile for Android - Home Users - Mozilla Firefox

File Edit View History Bookmarks Tools Help

http://www.spectorsoft.com/products/eBlaster-Mobile-Android/index-h.asp?source=HomePage-slider-mob-eBmDroid

Most Visited Getting Started Latest Headlines

msnbc.com - Breakin... x Book Sales Statistics -... x RealClearPolitics - Op... x 7 Habits of Highly Fr... x Email & Web Security... x AOL AOL Mail (3428) x SpectorSoft - eBLA... x

eBLASTER | mobile

For Android™

Record and Forward Text Messages

REC MESSAGES: (9) New

Product Overview | FAQs | System Requirements | **Buy Now!**


Protect Your Child with eBLASTER Mobile for Android

Cell Phone Monitoring from SpectorSoft has arrived. Now you can monitor your child's Android phone from anywhere, whether you're in another room at home, at work, across town, or thousands of miles away.

With eBLASTER Mobile, you'll see:

If Your Child Is Where They Are Supposed To Be

Set up virtual fences around key locations, such as homes, schools, malls, libraries, sports facilities, friends' houses, work locations ... and be notified when your child enters or leaves these important places.



2:34pm
INSIDE FENCE


3:11pm
OUTSIDE FENCE

Hello! SMS/Text Messages

Get transcripts of text message conversations - every

Web History

Review the address of EVERY website your child



\$69⁹⁵ **Buy Now!**

FREE SAMPLE REPORT



Enter your email address to receive a FREE Sample eBLASTER Mobile Activity

Live Chat



Worried about your child or employee's phone or tablet usage?

- ✓ **Block phone numbers** from calls and text messages
- ✓ Set custom **time restrictions** and **block apps** you choose
- ✓ Monitor **text messages** and get custom activity alerts
- ✓ Real time **location tracking** and **lock commands**

[See Features](#)

[Purchase now](#)



Block Activity

[more info](#)

Block any phone number from texting, calls, or both.



Set Time Limits

[more info](#)

Lock the device during certain times of day or just restrict calls.



Track GPS

[more info](#)

Get instant locations or remotely lock/unlock the device.



Monitor Online

[more info](#)

Login to a secure online control panel to view the logs.

www.NoSlang.com



Internet Slang Dictionary & Translator

Confused by net slang? Can't read a text message?
Translate internet slang and acronyms.

- [Slang Translator](#)
- [Slang Dictionary](#)
- [Netspeak Guide](#)
- [Add Slang](#)
- [FAQ](#)
- [Search](#)
- [More ↓](#)

Parents. Want to get up to speed quickly? Start with our [Parent's Guide](#)

Internet Slang Translator

Translate Internet Slang & Online Acronyms:

Enter internet slang or IM acronyms such as idk, afk, blog, or lol and our dictionary will translate ur netspeak. It even handles l33t (just check the box below)

Swear Filter Translate l33t Include Rejects?

[Translate Slang](#)

Think You Know Slang?

- [Slang Quiz Part 1](#)
- [Slang Quiz Part 2](#)

Sites Using NoSlang:

- [Text & URL Shortener](#)
- [Free Text Messages](#)

Like 589 people like this.

Quick Links

- [Drug Slang](#)
- [Top 25 for parents](#)
- [Misspelled Words](#)
- [Twitter Slang](#)
- [Sexing Terms](#)
- [Rejected Slang](#)
- [Addons & Plugins](#)
- [Warcraft Slang](#)

Text Messaging Dictionary

Search multiple engines for text messaging dictionary
[www.webcrawler.com](#)

Ads by Google



Internet Text and Drug Slang Translator & Dictionary



Internet Slang Dictionary & Translator

Confused by net slang? Can't read a text message?
Translate internet slang and acronyms.

[Slang Translator](#) [Slang Dictionary](#) [Netspeak Guide](#) [Add Slang](#) [FAQ](#) [Search](#) [More ↓](#)

25 Internet Slang Terms All Parents Should Know:

Do you know what these terms mean? Your kids do!
Chances are they're using them online to talk to their friends. Some of them may shock you.
(sometimes used letters are in parentheses)

Also, make sure you read the [What Every Parent Must Know](#) article.

ASL(RP)	Age Sex Location (Race / Picture)
BF / GF	Boyfriend / Girlfriend
BRB	Be Right Back
CD9	Code 9 - means parents are around
GNOC	Get Naked on Cam (webcam)
GTG	Got to Go
IDK	I don't know
(L)MIRL	(Lets) meet in real life
LOL	Laugh Out Loud
MorF	Male or Female
MOS	Mom Over Shoulder
NIFOC	Naked in Front of Computer
Noob	Newbie - often an insult to somebody who doesn't know much about something.
NMU	Not much, you?
P911	Parent Emergency
PAW	Parents are Watching
PIR	Parent In Room
POS	Parent Over Shoulder
PRON	Porn
PRW	Parents Are Watching
S2R	Send To Recieve (pictures)
TDIM	Talk Dirty To Me

Feel safe &
sound for
\$1 a day.

[Learn More ▶](#)

Call Now **800-213-8370**

Sexting Slang Terms

Sexting can create serious long-term legal consequences for your child.

The screenshot shows a web browser window with the URL <http://www.noslang.com/sexting.php>. The page title is "Sexting Information - What All Parents Should Know". The main content is a list of "Common Sexting Slang Terms" with a warning: "Warning: some words can be considered offensive. This list is nowhere close to exhaustive, but it is intended on the fly." The list includes terms such as 8, 143, cu46, DUM, GNOC, GYPO, GNRN, FMH, IWS, IIT, Q2C, RUH, TDTM, S2R, NIFOC, SorG, JO, PAW, PIR, POS, YWS, and WYCM. A large black redaction box covers the right side of the list. To the right of the list are several advertisements: "Slang Dictionary", "Parenting Classes Online", "Is He Cheating On You?", and "Improve Attention Today". The browser's address bar and multiple tabs are visible at the top.

www.NoSlang.com



snapchat

What is Snapchat?

Snapchat is the fastest way to share a moment on iPhone and Android. You control how long you want your friends to view your messages. We'll let you know if we detect that they've taken a screenshot!

Is there any way to view an image after the time has expired?

No, snaps disappear after the timer runs out. You can save snaps that you capture by pressing the save button on the preview screen.

What if I take a screenshot?

Screenshots can be captured if you're quick. The sender will be notified if we detect you have taken a screenshot.



snapchat

What is Snapchat?

Snapchat is the fastest way to share a moment on iPhone and Android. You control how long you want your friends to view your messages. We'll let you know if we detect that they've taken a screenshot!

Is there any way to view an image that you can't see?

No, snaps disappear as soon as you view them.

that you can't see.

Some people can be captured if you're quick. **Can you screenshot?**

Some people can be captured if you're quick. The sender will be notified if we detect you have taken a screenshot.

A very popular app among teenagers that can be used to send pixs, including pornography. The pix ("snap") disappears in 10 seconds... Unless it doesn't... because it was saved quickly by the recipient and turned over to a very angry parent... and law enforcement.

preview snaps

Texting app



[About](#)

[Support](#)



50 million users love Kik

Kik is the fast, simple and personal smartphone messenger. What's not to love?



Texting app

The image shows a screenshot of the Kik Messenger website in a browser window. The browser's address bar shows 'kik.com'. The website features the Kik logo in green, navigation links for 'About', 'Support', and a blue 'Download' button. The main headline reads '50 million users love Kik'. Below this, a sub-headline states 'Kik is the fast, simple and personal smartphone messenger. What's not to love?'. At the bottom left, there are icons for the Apple App Store and the Google Play Store. On the right side, a smartphone is shown displaying the Kik app interface, including a conversation with 'Jessica Roberts' and several text messages.

Kik Messenger | Fast, Simple, Personal S... +

kik.com

☆ Google

kik.

About Support Download

50 million users love Kik

Kik is the fast, simple and personal smartphone messenger. What's not to love?

Apple Android

Very popular app used by kids to send text messages off-line, so that parents don't know what they're texting. Doesn't use the carriers, eg. Verizon, ATT, Sprint, etc.)

5:31 PM

Back Jessica Roberts

Really awesome!

Watched some amazing surfers ...

Epic surf sessi...

Check Fraud

Check Fraud

Why talk about Check Fraud?

Check Fraud

Produces more \$ Losses

than all other types of payment fraud

COMBINED!

In 1762...

Price sued Neal for check fraud

Price v. Neal, England

(The FIRST Check Fraud Lawsuit)

Plaintiff, Price, argued that:

Defendant, Neal, was indebted to him for 80£ for money had and received: and damages were laid to 100£. Plaintiff should recover back the money he paid them by mistake believing "that these were true genuine bills."

Plaintiff, Price, argued that:

Defendant, Neal, was indebted to him for 80£ for money had and received: and damages were laid to 100£. Plaintiff should recover back the money he paid them by mistake believing "that these were true genuine bills."

Plaintiff "could never recover it against the drawer, because no drawer existed;

Plaintiff, Price, argued that:

Defendant, Neal, was indebted to him for 80£ for money had and received: and damages were laid to 100£. Plaintiff should recover back the money he paid them by mistake believing "that these were true genuine bills."

Plaintiff "could never recover it against the drawer, because no drawer existed; nor against the forger, because he is hanged."

Plaintiff, Price, argued that:

Defendant, Neal, was indebted to him for 80£ for money had and received: and damages were laid to 100£. Plaintiff should recover back the money he paid them by mistake believing "that these were true genuine bills."

Plaintiff "could never recover it against the drawer, because no drawer existed; nor against the forger, because he is hanged."

The jury found a verdict for the Plaintiff; and assessed damages of 80£ and costs 40s.

**Check fraud has continued
unabated for 250 years!**

**Check fraud has continued
unabated for 250 years!**

but with fewer public hangings.

AFP 2014 Payments Fraud Survey

In 2013

70% of organizations
still issued checks.


Check fraud will never go away!

AFP 2014 Payments Fraud Survey

"...checks continue to be the dominant payment form targeted by fraudsters,"
with 82% of affected organizations reporting that their checks were targeted."


Fraudulent Payments by Method


(Respondents were hit multiple ways; total > 100%)



Fraud Losses by Method

How Dollars were actually lost






Frank Abagnale

Catch Me If You Can

Technology is making Frank Abagnale's "gift" achievable by mere mortals





Boston's #1 Seller

The Evolution
of
Check Fraud
and
Banker Solutions

Counterfeit Checks

(since 1762)

...Banks developed Positive Pay


Altered Payees

...Banks developed Payee Positive Pay

Added Payee Names

Checks blow right through Payee Positive Pay!

Typical Check Layout



**Added Payee printed 2 lines above original name
will not be detected by Payee Positive Pay**

Multiple Payees:

If it doesn't say AND,

it is "ambiguous" and legally means

"OR"

A forward slash [virgule, vær-gyül "/"] = OR

Strategies to Prevent

Check Fraud



Don't Write Checks!

- **Use Commercial Purchase Cards**
- **Pay electronically (ACH)**

Commercial Purchase Card Benefits

1. Reduces check writing and check fraud risk
2. Does not expose the checking account number
3. Terminating a card is easier than closing a checking account
4. Reduces bank per-item fees
5. Potential for Rebates or Rewards

ACH Payment Benefits

1. Reduces check writing and check fraud risk
2. Does not expose the checking account number
3. Reduces mailing expense and bank fees
4. Pay 1 invoice at a time, or
5. Pay multiple invoices and email remittance detail

**But, if you're going to
write checks...**



#1. High Security Checks

**Effective check fraud
prevention strategies begin
with a high security check.**

AFP 2014 Payments Fraud Survey

Types of Check Fraud Alterations:

- 1. Payee Name Alterations = 52%**
- 2. Dollar Amount Alterations = 37%**

AFP 2014 Payments Fraud Survey

Types of Check Fraud Alterations:

- 1. Payee Name Alterations = 52%**
- 2. Dollar Amount Alterations = 37%**

This is up from 49% and 22% respectively,
in the 2013 Survey....

High Security Checks

1. Thwart forgers' attempts to replicate or alter the check
2. Deter the forger (psychological warfare)
3. Provide legal protection from some Holder in Due Course claims (UCC § 3-302)

What makes a check
secure?

10+ safety features

Important Security Features

- **Controlled Check Stock**
- **Dual-tone True Watermark**
- **Thermochromatic Ink (reacts to heat)**
- **Warning Bands worded correctly**
- **Toner Anchorage**
- **Copy Void Pantograph**
- **Chemical-reactive Ink + Paper**
- **Inventory Control Number on Back (laser)**
- **UV Ink + UV Fibers**
- **Microprinting**
- **Laid Lines**

Controlled Check Stock

- Is a critical security feature
- Checks should be unique in some way to every other organization's check stock
- No two organizations should have the exact, identical check stock

Uncontrolled Check Stock

- Is NOT uniquely designed or customized for each end-user
- It is often sold entirely blank to countless entities / organizations, and fraudsters, by print brokers all over the USA

Who Sells Blank, Uncontrolled Checks?


- Virtually ALL **accounting / check writing** Software Vendors
- Virtually ALL check printers
 1. Large, national printers
 2. Small print brokers that buy from wholesalers

Ask your check supplier this question:

Has your check stock ever been sold
entirely blank to other companies?

Obtaining Controlled Check Stock

1. **Custom-manufacture** checks using an ORIGINAL design, true-watermarked paper, and at least 10 security features, **OR**
2. **Buy from a supplier** that sells controlled check stock that has never been replicated or used in a check fraud scam.



#2. Payee Positive Pay

Positive Pay...

...a powerful tool!

PositivePay.net

However.... Positive Pay

Provides NO PROTECTION Against

However.... Positive Pay

Provides NO PROTECTION Against

Added Payee Names!

CINCINNATI INSURANCE COMPANY v. WACHOVIA BANK, NATIONAL
ASSOCIATION

CASE NO. 08-CV-2734 (PJS/JJG).

*CINCINNATI INSURANCE COMPANY, as Subrogee of Todd's Snax, Inc., d/b/a Schultz
Foods Company, Plaintiff,*

v.

WACHOVIA BANK, NATIONAL ASSOCIATION, Defendant.

*United States District Court, D. Minnesota.
July 14, 2010.*

Lawsuit

Cincinnati Insurance Company

v.

Wachovia Bank

\$154,000 Loss from an Altered Payee

Facts

Prior to the \$154,000 loss, Schultz Foods had three (3) separate check fraud events.

Facts

Prior to the \$154,000 loss, Schultz Foods had three (3) separate check fraud events.

Wachovia Bank covered their losses; told Schultz to use Positive Pay or close their account.

Facts

Prior to the \$154,000 loss, Schultz Foods had three (3) separate check fraud events.

Wachovia Bank covered their losses; told Schultz to use Positive Pay or close their account.

Each time Schultz closed their account, but never implemented Positive Pay.

Facts

**Schultz buys check fraud insurance from
Cincinnati Insurance.**

Facts

Schultz Foods issues \$154,000 check payable to Amerada Hess Corporation.

Check is stolen. Payee Name altered.

Name changed to "Kenneth Payton"

Kenneth Payton, a minister, deposits \$154,000 check into TCF Bank and wires \$150,000 to Singapore to help a South African refugee family.

Facts

6 weeks later, Schultz Foods notifies Wachovia of altered payee; demands repayment.

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Wachovia won't pay until it recovers \$ from TCF.

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Wachovia won't pay until it recovers \$ from TCF.

Schultz files a claim with Cincinnati Insurance;
Cincinnati pays the claim and sues Wachovia.

Facts

6 weeks later, Schultz Foods notifies Wachovia of altered payee; demands repayment.

Wachovia won't pay until it recovers \$ from TCF.

Schultz files a claim with Cincinnati Insurance; Cincinnati pays the claim and sues Wachovia.

Under UCC § 3-119, TCF Bank (the liable party) hires attys to defend Wachovia, using Wachovia's signed "deposit agreement" against Cincinnati Insurance.

Wachovia's Deposit Agreement (Contract)

"You agree that if you fail to implement any of these products or services, or you fail to follow these and other precautions reasonable for your particular circumstances, you will be precluded from asserting any claims against [Wachovia] for paying any unauthorized, altered, counterfeit or other fraudulent item that such product, service, or precaution was designed to detect or deter, and we will not be required to re-credit your account or otherwise have any liability for paying such items."

Because of the signed deposit
agreement,

Wachovia Bank Wins!

**This case demonstrates you can have a great
relationship with your bank and still lose a lawsuit!**

Fact

If Schultz Foods had used Positive Pay, the check may not have paid and there may not have been a loss!

Fact

If Schultz Foods had used Positive Pay, the check may not have paid and there may not have been a loss!

(Exception: Added Payee Names)

Preventing Altered Payees

- **High-security checks**
- **14 point font for Payee Name**
- **High-quality toner**
- **Hot laser printer**
- **Payee Positive Pay**

Frank Abagnale's Fraud Bulletin on Laser Check Printing

What about Added Payee Names?

It Is A Fact:


Payee Positive Pay systems are not detecting

Added Payee Names...

...printed 2 lines above the original payee name.

There is NO banker solution!

Typical Check Layout



Fix it: Use a Secure Name Font

Secure Name Font printed above original payee name helps eliminate Added Payee Name Risk

WARNING! DO NOT ACCEPT THIS CHECK UNLESS YOU CAN SEE A TRUE WATERMARK WHEN HOLDING THE CHECK TO THE LIGHT AND PINK LOCK AND KEY ICONS THAT FADE WHEN WARMED

SAFE Checks
8934 Eton Avenue
Canoga Park, CA 91304
(800) 755-2265 • Fax (800) 615-2265
safechecks.com • supercheck.NET

Any Bank
My Town, Any State
11-777/1222

This Check is Protected By™
CheckGuard

Check Number
300257

CHECK DATE	CHECK AMOUNT
3/8/2010	\$89,562.23

PAY **\$89,562.23**
DOLLAR EIGHT NINE THOUSAND FIVE HUNDRED SIXTY TWO PERIOD TWO THREE

EIGHTY NINE THOUSAND FIVE HUNDRED SIXTY TWO DOLLARS AND 23/100 CENTS

Payee **GREG LITSTER** ← **Secure Name Font**

TO THE ORDER OF
GREG LITSTER
SAFEChecks
8934 Eton Avenue
Canoga Park, CA 91304

THIS CHECK EXPIRES AND IS VOID 25 DAYS FROM ISSUE DATE

NON-NEGOTIABLE

⑈ 300257⑈ ⑆999999999⑆ 111111111⑈

PAYEE NAME ON FILE AT THE BANK

THIS CHECK CLEARS THROUGH POSITIVE PAY

THIS CHECK EXPIRES AND IS VOID 25 DAYS FROM ISSUE DATE

Leaves No Room for Adding Bogus Payee

Secure Name Font printed above original payee name helps eliminate Added Payee Name Risk

WARNING! DO NOT ACCEPT THIS CHECK UNLESS YOU CAN SEE A TRUE WATERMARK WHEN HOLDING THE CHECK TO THE LIGHT AND PINK LOCK AND KEY ICONS THAT FADE WHEN WARMED

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DOLLAR EIGHT NINE THIRTY FIVE SIX TWO PERIOD TWO THREE

EIGHTY NINE THOUSAND FIVE HUNDRED SIXTY TWO DOLLARS AND 23/100 CENTS

Payee **GREG LITSTER**

TO THE ORDER OF
GREG LITSTER
SAFEChecks
8934 Eton Avenue
Canoga Park, CA 91304

THIS CHECK EXPIRES AND IS VOID 25 DAYS FROM ISSUE DATE

NON-NEGOTIABLE

⑈ 300257⑈ ⑆9999999999⑆ 1111111111⑈

PAYEE NAME ON FILE AT THE BANK

THIS CHECK CLEARS THROUGH POSITIVE PAY

No room for an Added Payee

Deterrence: Add Text to the Check

WARNING! DO NOT ACCEPT THIS CHECK UNLESS YOU CAN SEE A TRUE WATERMARK WHEN HOLDING THE CHECK TO THE LIGHT AND PINK LOCK AND KEY ICONS THAT FADE WHEN FARMED

SAFE Checks
8934 Eton Avenue
Canoga Park, CA 91304
(800) 755-2265 • Fax (800) 615-2265
safechecks.com • supercheck.NET

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My Town, Any State
11-777/1222

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CheckGuard

Check Number
300257

CHECK DATE	CHECK AMOUNT
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PAY **\$89,562.23**
DOLLAR EIGHT NINE THOUSAND FIVE HUNDRED SIXTY TWO DOLLARS AND 23/100 CENTS

Payee **GREG LITSTER**

TO THE ORDER OF
GREG LITSTER
SAFEChecks
8934 Eton Avenue
Canoga Park, CA 91304

THIS CHECK EXPIRES AND IS VOID 25 DAYS FROM ISSUE DATE

NON-NEGOTIABLE

300 257 9999999999 1111111111

PAYEE NAME ON FILE AT THE BANK

THIS CHECK CLEARS THROUGH POSITIVE PAY

Deterrence: Encrypted barcode

WARNING! DO NOT ACCEPT THIS CHECK UNLESS YOU CAN SEE A TRUE WATERMARK WHEN HOLDING THE CHECK TO THE LIGHT AND PINK LOCK AND KEY ICONS THAT FADE WHEN WARMED

SAFE Checks
8934 Eton Avenue
Canoga Park, CA 91304
(800) 755-2265 • Fax (800) 615-2265
safechecks.com • supercheck.NET

Any Bank
My Town, Any State
11-777/1222

This Check is Protected By™
CheckGuard

Check Number
300257

CHECK DATE	CHECK AMOUNT
3/8/2010	\$89,562.23

\$89,562.23
DOLLAR EIGHT NINE THOUSAND FIVE HUNDRED SIXTY TWO DOLLARS AND 23/100 CENTS

PAY EIGHTY NINE THOUSAND FIVE HUNDRED SIXTY TWO DOLLARS AND 23/100 CENTS

Payee **GREG LITSTER**

TO THE ORDER OF
GREG LITSTER
SAFEChecks
8934 Eton Avenue
Canoga Park, CA 91304

THIS CHECK EXPIRES AND IS VOID 25 DAYS FROM ISSUE DATE

NON-NEGOTIABLE

|| 300257 || : 9999999999 : 1111111111 ||

THIS CHECK CLEARS THROUGH POSITIVE PAY

Barcode contains:

1. Drawer
2. Payee Name
3. Dollar Amount
4. Issue Date
5. Check Number
6. Account Number
7. Routing/Transit Number
8. Date and Time Check was printed
9. Laser Printer used
10. The employee that printed the check

Barcode is created

by a

Printer Driver

Printer driver can:


1. Accumulate check data for Positive Pay
2. Change Font size
3. Add Barcode, Secure Name & Number fonts
4. Be configured to send Pos Pay files to the bank automatically
5. Reposition Check Placement



Typical Check Layout –

Check is on top and shows thru window envelope

Printer Driver can Reposition the Check



8934 Eton Avenue
Canoga Park, CA 91304

GREG LITSTER
SAFEChecks
8934 Eton Avenue
Canoga Park, CA 91304

Check Number: 300257
Check Date: 3/8/2010

Invoice Date	Type	Reference	Gross Amount	Amount Due	Disc. Amount	Amount Paid
						89,562.23

Payee Name, Address, is printed in TOP white panel.

Check is re-positioned to the bottom.

Check is Z-folded with TOP PANEL showing thru window

It is not obvious the envelope contains a check.

WARNING: DO NOT ACCEPT THIS CHECK UNLESS YOU CAN SEE A FAIR WATERMARK WHEN HOLDING THE CHECK TO THE LIGHT AND THE COLORED STRIPS AND FASTENERS THAT FADE WHEN WASHED.

SAFEChecks
8934 Eton Avenue
Canoga Park, CA 91304
(800) 755-2265 • Fax (800) 615-2265
safechecks.com • supercheck.NET

Any Bank
My Town, Any State 11-7771/222

This Check is Protected By™
ImageShield

Check Number
300257

CHECK DATE	CHECK AMOUNT
3/8/2010	\$89,562.23

PAY **\$89,562.23**
EIGHTY NINE THOUSAND FIVE HUNDRED SIXTY TWO DOLLARS AND 23/100 CENTS

Payee **GREG LITSTER**
TO THE ORDER OF
GREG LITSTER
SAFEChecks
8934 Eton Avenue
Canoga Park, CA 91304

THIS CHECK EXPIRES AND IS VOID 25 DAYS FROM ISSUE DATE

NON-NEGOTIABLE

⑈ 300257⑈ ⑆ 9999999999 ⑆ 1111111111⑈

THIS CHECK CANNOT BE DEPOSITED THROUGH POSITIVE PAY

PLEASE NAME ON FILE AT THE BANK

THIS CHECK CANNOT BE DEPOSITED THROUGH POSITIVE PAY

DO NOT BREATH, BLOW, PINK, LICK, OR WET. COLOR WILL FADE AND BE FURNISHED AN ANALOGUE. CHECK IF COLOR DOES NOT FADE. DO NOT ACCEPT.

Identical data is printed on both checks. Which check would forgers prefer to attack?

WARNING! DO NOT ACCEPT THIS CHECK UNLESS YOU CAN SEE A TRUE WATERMARK WHEN HOLDING THE CHECK TO THE LIGHT AND PINK LOCK AND KEY ICONS THAT FADE WHEN WARMED

SAFE Checks
8934 Eton Avenue
Canoga Park, CA 91304
(800) 755-2265

ANY BANK
MY TOWN, ANY STATE
USA
11-777/1222

3/8/2010

PAY TO THE ORDER OF **Greg Litster** \$ **89,562.23

Eighty-Nine Thousand Five Hundred Sixty-Two and 23/100***** DOLLARS

Greg Litster
SAFEChecks
8934 Eton Avenue
Canoga Park, CA 91304

MEMO **VOID**

⑆999999999⑆ 111111111⑆

RUB OR BREATHE ON THE PINK LOCK & KEY ICONS - COLOR WILL FADE AND RE-TURN ON AN AUTHENTIC CHECK - IF COLOR DOES NOT FADE DO NOT ACCEPT

WARNING! DO NOT ACCEPT THIS CHECK UNLESS YOU CAN SEE A TRUE WATERMARK WHEN HOLDING THE CHECK TO THE LIGHT AND PINK LOCK AND KEY ICONS THAT FADE WHEN WARMED

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Any Bank
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Check Number
300257

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ChecksGuard

CHECK DATE	CHECK AMOUNT
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⑆89,562.23⑆
DOLLAR EIGHT NINE THOUSAND FIVE HUNDRED SIXTY TWO PERIOD TWO THREE

PAY **EIGHTY NINE THOUSAND FIVE HUNDRED SIXTY TWO DOLLARS AND 23/100 CENTS**

Payee **GREG LITSTER**

TO THE ORDER OF **GREG LITSTER**
SAFEChecks
8934 Eton Avenue
Canoga Park, CA 91304

THIS CHECK EXPIRES AND IS VOID 25 DAYS FROM ISSUE DATE

NON-NEGOTIABLE

⑆300257⑆ ⑆999999999⑆ 111111111⑆

RUB OR BREATHE ON THE PINK LOCK & KEY ICONS - COLOR WILL FADE AND RE-TURN ON AN AUTHENTIC CHECK - IF COLOR DOES NOT FADE DO NOT ACCEPT

Holder in Due Course

Web: FraudTips.net

Holder in Due Course

- An innocent party who accepts a check for goods or services
- No evidence of alteration or forgery, or knowledge of fraud by recipient
- **Statute of Limitations**
 - 10 years from date of issue
 - Three (3) years from date of return
- A Holder in Due Course can sell his/her rights

Holder in Due Course

- Trumps Stop Payments
- Trumps Positive Pay

Trump (n.) To get the better of an adversary or competitor by using a crucial, often hidden resource.

Holder in Due Course

Federal Appellate Court

Lawsuits

HIDC & Stop Payments

Robert Triffin v. Cigna Insurance

- Two year old check; payment stopped
- No "expiration date" printed on check
 - **UCC: Check valid for 10 years or 3 years**
- Print on checks: "This check expires and is void 25 days from issue date"
 - ✓ **Don't re-issue check until first check expires**

<http://caselaw.findlaw.com/nj-superior-court-appellate-division/1093442.html>

<http://www.jurispro.com/files/documents/doc-1066206627-article-2071.pdf>

Someone who accepts an
expired Instrument

Has No Legal Standing!

As a Holder in Due Course

HIDC & Controlled Check Stock

➤ Robert Triffin v. Somerset Valley Bank and Hauser Contracting Company

- 80 counterfeit checks totaling \$25,000 on authentic-looking check stock
- Bank returns them as counterfeit
- Triffin buys \$8,800 in returned checks from four check cashing stores, and as a HIDC, sued Hauser for NEGLIGENCE for not controlling his check stock.

HIDC & Controlled Check Stock

- Lower court rules in favor of Triffin, saying **the checks looked “genuine”**
- Hauser appealed; claimed he never had possession of the checks or authorized their issuance.
- **Federal Appellate Court UPHELD lower court; ruled the checks looked “genuine”**
- **Hauser Contracting ordered to pay Triffin \$8,800**
- **Solution: Use controlled, high security checks**

HIDC & Controlled Check Stock

Robert Triffin v. Pomerantz Staffing Services

- 18 counterfeit checks drawn on Pomerantz' acct cashed at check cashing store. All checks under \$400.
- Each check had a PRINTED warning: "THE BACK OF THIS CHECK HAS HEAT SENSITIVE INK TO CONFIRM AUTHENTICITY."
- Check casher cashed the checks without examining the checks

HIDC & Controlled Check Stock

Robert Triffin v. Pomerantz Staffing Services...

- Counterfeit checks looked authentic on face, but had no heat-sensitive ink on the back
 - Because cashier failed to verify heat-sensitive ink on back, it could not claim Holder in Due Course status
 - Triffin LOST because the security feature was absent, and forged signature was not specifically disavowed

- Pomerantz' check security features helped save him

<http://lawlibrary.rutgers.edu/courts/appellate/a2002-02.opn.html>

Embezzlement




Embezzlement



Embezzlers



Embezzlers




Robert Rizzo

Former City Manager, Bell, CA



Robert Rizzo

Sentence: 12 years

A photograph of Robert Rizzo, a middle-aged man with grey hair, wearing a dark suit, light blue shirt, and patterned tie. He is standing in a courtroom, looking down with a somber expression. His hands are resting on a dark wooden table. In the background, a police officer in a tan uniform is visible, and the room has wood-paneled walls.

Russell R. Wasendorf, Sr.



The largest embezzlement case in 2012: **\$215 million**, stolen over 20 years from 13,000 clients of Peregrine Financial Group, aka BFGBest! **Wasendorf, 64**, of Cedar Falls, Iowa.

Russell R. Wasendorf, Sr.



Sentence: 50 years

Harriette Walters



Served as **Tax Assessments Manager**
for the District of Columbia

Harriette Walters



Sentence: 17 years

Atty: "She had a rough childhood. She stole the money so that she could give some of it away, which made her feel better about herself."

**Control Incoming Mail
to Avoid Employee Theft**

Companies should use their bank's

Lockbox Service

Cost: \$5/day + \$0.35 / item

Lockbox completely eliminates the risk of diverted deposits.

You cannot hire someone that inexpensively!

Uniform Commercial Code (UCC)



“Reasonable Employee Rule”

Section 3-405 adopts the principle that the risk of loss for fraudulent endorsements by employees who are entrusted with the responsibility with respect to checks should fall on the employer rather than on the bank that takes the check or pays it, if the bank was not negligent in the transaction.

“Reasonable Employee Rule”

Section 3-405 is based on the belief that the employer is in a far better position to avoid the loss by care and choosing employees, in supervising them, and in adopting other measures to prevent forged endorsements on instruments payable to the employer.

Source: Clark's Bank Deposits and Payments Monthly
January 1995: Volume 3 #7

Control Outgoing Mail to Avoid Employee Theft

Deterrence

Surprise Audits

Surprise Audits are an effective psychological deterrent against potential embezzlers.

Surprise Audits

- ✓ Obtain and audit original source documents
- ✓ Don't let the auditee retrieve the documents. Pull them yourself if possible
- ✓ Adequate segregation of duties is the key. (In small organizations, find someone to monitor person who handles money)
- ✓ Test the composition of the cash collected with the composition of deposit
- ✓ Don't let the auditee explain away exceptions to your tests
- ✓ Prosecute if possible. Inform employees what happened

If you suspect embezzlement and intend to prosecute, DO NOT tamper with evidence.

DO NOT physically search the computer.

Make a “mirror” of the hard drive and search the mirror. Searching the computer is tampering with evidence.

“Common Sense” Controls to Prevent Fraud

- Vendors
 - Segregate approval of vendors from authorization of payments
 - Current authorized signer list
 - System that won't allow duplicate payments
 - Timely vendor payments including verification of goods / services
 - Timely reconciliation of paid checks and review of check images to records

“Common Sense” Controls to Prevent Fraud

- **Purchasing (CC's / P Cards)**
 - Written Policy with guidelines
 - Cardholder acceptance / Signature
 - Merchant / Category restrictions
 - Timely review of charges
- **Skimming of Cash**
 - Segregation of Duties
 - Policy on Voids / Credits
 - Pre-numbered Receipts / Information
 - Regular and Frequent Surprise Cash Counts

Embezzlement Detection

Warning Signs

Warning Signs

- **Extravagant lifestyle** that seems incongruent with employee compensation
- **Unusual behavior** of key employees, such as depression or mood swings
- **Reluctance** of key employees to take **vacations**
- **Discomfort or unease** when another employee must fill in for them

Warning Signs

- **First major purchase is usually a new vehicle**
- **Home renovations**
- **Boats**
- **Exotic vacations**
- **Second homes**

Embezzlement Prevention Strategies

Educate Your Employees

Employees are your best detection source.

Educate them about what fraud is, how it hurts everyone, and how to report it.

Embezzlement Prevention Strategies

- Separation of duties

UCC: Organizations are responsible for acts of its employees

- Review bank statements / check images

Embezzlement Prevention Strategies

- Bank Reconciliation performed by someone other than the check issuers
- Income Statement and Balance Sheet must be current EVERY month
- Examine Income Statement, Balance Sheet, Accounts Payable, Accounts Receivable monthly
- Examine A/R detail for “**credit memos.**”
- Inside A/R, **look at individual customers’ history** for credit memos.

Embezzlement Prevention Strategies

- Establish confidential support systems for employees with addiction, emotional or mental issues.
- Increase Embezzlement insurance
- Add Cyber Crime, Check Fraud insurance


Tip Hotline

Anonymous Tips: #1 method of discovering embezzlement

Set up an anonymous “**Tip Hotline**” accessible by:

1. Employees
2. Vendors
3. Taxpayers
4. Outsiders

Source of Tips



Tighter Internal Controls

- Secure all check stock (lock and key)
- Restrict employee access to check supply
- Physical inventory of check supply regularly
- **Reconcile accounts immediately** (UCC: 30 days)
- Secure facsimile signature plate (lock and key)
- Never sign a check with a rubber stamp
- **Use a cloth ribbon when typing manual checks**
- **Embezzlement**
 - Separate financial duties

Please review Embezzlement

in

Frank Abagnale's Fraud Bulletin

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